Minoritarian Activism – Judicial Politics in the European Union by Larsson, Olof
Minoritarian Activism
Judicial Politics in the European Union
Olof Larsson
Go¨teborg studies in Politics 148
2016
Avhandlingen baseras p˚a fo¨ljande delstudier:
Larsson, Olof and Naurin, Daniel (2016). Judicial Independence and
Political Uncertainty. How the Risk of Override Impacts on the Court
of Justice of the EU. In: International Organization 70.2.
Larsson, Olof. Overriding the CJEU? The Legislative Fate of the
Most Contested CJEU Judgments, 1997-2008. Unpublished manuscript.
Larsson, Olof and Naurin, Daniel. Split Vision. Multi-Dimensionality
in the International Legal Policy Space. Unpublished Manuscript.
Larsson, Olof et al. (2016). Speaking Law to Power The Strategic
Use of Precedent of the Court of Justice of the European Union. In:
Comparative Political Studies. First published online on April 11, 2016.
Akademisk avhandling fo¨r filosofie doktorsexamen i statsvetenskap som
med tillst˚and av samha¨llsvetenskapliga fakultetsna¨mnden vid Go¨teborgs
universitet framla¨gges till offentlig gransking m˚andagen den 12 decem-
ber, kl. 13.15 i ho¨rsalen Dragonen, Spra¨ngkullsgatan 19, Go¨teborg.
DEPARTMENT OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE
Larsson, Olof. 2016. Minoritarian Activism. Judicial Politics in the
European Union. Go¨teborg Studies in Politics 148, edited by Bo Roth-
stein. Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg, Box
711, 405 30 Go¨teborg, Sweden. ISBN 978-91-629-0016-8 (PRINT), 978-
91-629-0015-1 (PDF), ISSN 0346-5942.
Abstract
Is the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) best described as a run-away
agent, free to influence the EU according to its own preferences, or as an
obedient servant of EU member state governments? In this dissertation,
Olof Larsson argues that neither description fits the CJEU. Rather, the
CJEU is dependent upon the support of at least a minority of EU mem-
ber states in order to be able to change the EU in ways counter to the
wishes of the majority. The CJEU has not become one of the most
powerful institutions of the EU because it has been insulated from gov-
ernment pressures, but rather because the governments of the EU have
been divided on most of the important issues. Inspired by Separation-of-
Powers theories developed to explain the Supreme Court of the United
States, it is argued that these divisions among the member states has
been an underestimated factor in explaining the independence of the
CJEU. Correspondingly, the more united the governments are against
the Court, the higher the risk of backlashes, i.e. political attacks against
the Court or attempts to change the impact of its decisions.
The dissertation is composed of four empirical chapters, two of which
have previously been published in peer-reviewed journals. In the first,
Larsson and co-authors argue that the CJEU reacts to the stated pref-
erences of the EU member states in ways which can best be explained
as a strategic adaptation in order to minimize the risk of backlashes. In
the second, Larsson argues that such backlashes have happened. In the
third, Larsson and co-authors argue that the most fundamental division
among the EU member states in regards to the issues the CJEU han-
dles is one between Liberal and Social Market Economies. In the fourth
and final empirical chapter it is argued that the CJEU also uses legal
arguments, in the form of references to precedent, in order to convince
recalcitrant governments of the validity of its judgments. In short, the
CJEU both listens to and speaks back to EU governments. These gov-
ernments are often divided along lines separating Social from Liberal
Market Economies, but when they are sufficiently united, backlashes
against the CJEU do happen.
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